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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 19-3391 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
RICHARD MURPHY, 
 
               Appellant  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cr-00230-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 7, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Murphy appeals the District Court’s judgment revoking his supervised 
release.  Because there was sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that Murphy 
violated the terms of his supervised release, we will affirm. 
I 
 Murphy was on supervised release following his 41-month prison term for a drug-
related offense.  One of the conditions of Murphy’s supervised release was that he not 
commit another federal, state, or local crime.  The United States Probation Office learned 
that state law enforcement had charged Murphy with burglary and assault based on 
allegations that he kicked down the door of the residence of his estranged girlfriend, 
Mindalia Colon, and assaulted her.  The state later dropped the charges.1    
 The District Court convened a hearing to determine whether Murphy’s supervised 
release should be revoked based on these allegations.  The Court heard a 911 call that 
Colon had placed as well as testimony from Colon, a police officer, and other witnesses.  
During the 911 call, Colon reported that Murphy had kicked in the door to her home and 
beat her.  The officer who responded to Colon’s home testified that Colon told him that 
Murphy kicked in the door, beat her, and fled.  Police photographed Colon’s injuries and 
the damage to the door.   
 
1 Sometime after the incident, Colon asked the responding officer to rescind the 
arrest warrant filed against Murphy and told the officer that Murphy was not the 
perpetrator.  Colon also told the District Attorney’s office that Murphy was not the 
offender and attempted to hire an attorney to assist in Murphy’s defense.   
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 Colon’s friend, Susan McMullins, testified that Colon called from the hospital and 
told McMullins that Murphy broke in and beat her.  McMullins’s husband corroborated 
Colon’s call and testified that he tried to repair the broken-in door at Colon’s house, but it 
was too badly damaged.  The McMullins also stated that they knew Colon and Murphy 
had been arguing before the assault.2     
 Colon admitted that she placed the 911 call but testified that she lied to the 911 
operator and police officers.  Colon testified instead that Murphy had not broken in and 
did not harm her, and that he had permission to come and go from her home, as they had 
a child together.  She also denied telling Susan McMullins that Murphy assaulted her. 
 The District Court considered the 911 call, statements and testimony from the 
McMullins, the responding officer, and Colon, as well as crime scene photographs.  The 
Court found that Colon’s statements to the 911 operator, police, and Susan McMullins 
describing Murphy as the assailant were credible and that Colon’s recantation was 
“incredible.”  App. 58-60.   
Based on this evidence, the District Court held that Murphy violated his 
supervised release by committing violations of state law.  The Court found that 
circumstantial evidence showed that Murphy committed burglary because he intended to 
commit assault and “gained entry by kicking the door in, which is breaking and entering 
regardless of whether, on other[,] [ ] happier occasions [Murphy] [was] welcomed into 
the house.”  App 58.  Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of a burglary 
conviction did not prevent the Court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
 
2 While on supervised release, Murphy was going to stay with the McMullins.   
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that Murphy committed burglary.  Likewise, the Court concluded that the 911 call, Susan 
McMullins’s testimony, and the photographs of Colon’s injuries established that Murphy 
committed assault.  The fact that the District Attorney had decided not to pursue the 
burglary and assault charges was not determinative because, in the Court’s view, the 
evidence would have been sufficient to find Murphy guilty of assault not just by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt.  As a result, the Court 
revoked Murphy’s supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ 
imprisonment.  Murphy appeals.  
II3 
  Murphy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the District Court’s 
decision to revoke his supervised release.4  To revoke a term of supervised release, the 
Court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a 
condition of his supervised release.5  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  “When the condition is that 
the defendant not commit a crime, there is no requirement of conviction or even 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 
3583(e)(3).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
4 The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a violation of a 
condition of supervised release is reviewed for clear error.  United States v. Poellnitz, 372 
F.3d 562, 565 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004).  A finding is clearly erroneous where “although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Anderson v. City of Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation omitted).  We review legal questions de novo.  
United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review a district court’s 
decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion.  Id.   
5 “[T]he preponderance standard simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the 
existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”  United States v. Blackston, 
940 F.2d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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indictment.”  United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) .  “What 
matters is whether [the defendant] committed [a] crime as a matter of fact.”  Id. at 567.  
Thus, “to revoke [supervised release,] it is not necessary that the [defendant] be adjudged 
guilty of a crime, but only that the court be reasonably satisfied that he has violated one 
of the conditions” of his release.  Id. at 566 (citation omitted).  
Here, Murphy was charged with violating the term of supervised release that 
required that he not commit any federal, state, or local crime, and that he violated this 
condition by committing burglary and assault in violation of Pennsylvania law.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[a] person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to 
commit a crime therein, the person . . . enters a building or occupied structure, . . . and the 
person commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein,” 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3502(a), unless “[t]he actor is licensed or privileged to enter,” § 3502(b)(3).  
“[A] person is guilty of assault [under Pennsylvania law] if he . . . attempts to cause or 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 2701(a)(1).  The preponderance of the evidence shows that Murphy committed 
both offenses. 
The evidence showed that Murphy forcibly entered Colon’s residence, and once 
inside, he beat Colon.  In the 911 call, Colon reported that Murphy broke into the 
premises and beat her.  Photographs of the door, as well as testimony from the police and 
Mr. McMullins confirmed the forced entry.  In addition, photographs of Colon, her own 
statements to the 911 operator, and her statements to others immediately after the event 
confirm that she had been beaten and that Murphy did it.  Taking this evidence together, 
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the District Court had sufficient evidence to find that Murphy committed burglary and 
assault.  App. 58-60.   
Murphy contends that he was “licensed or privileged to enter,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
3502(b)(3), based on Colon’s testimony that he was authorized on the premises and had a 
key and thus could not have committed a burglary.  We disagree.  As the District Court 
observed, those who are welcome and authorized do not need to kick the door down.  
Once inside, Murphy beat and injured Colon.  Thus, the Court had a sufficient basis to 
conclude that Murphy violated the conditions of his supervised release by committing 
burglary.   
Murphy also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a revocation 
because Colon reported only an assault, and not a burglary, she testified that Murphy was 
not the attacker, and he had permission to enter her property..  We disagree here too.  
Although it is true that Colon recanted her accusations against Murphy, the District Court 
found Colon’s recantation “incredible.”  App. 58-60.  We generally will not disturb a 
district court’s credibility determinations.  United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“[Our] review is more deferential with respect to determinations about the 
credibility of witnesses, and when the district court’s decision is based on testimony that 
is coherent and plausible, not internally inconsistent and not contradicted by external 
evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear error.”).  Moreover, the evidence 
supports the Court’s conclusion that Colon’s recantation was unworthy of credence.  
Immediately after the assault, Colon placed a 911 call recounting Murphy’s forcible entry 
and beating.  Photographs corroborated Colon’s injuries, consistent with a beating, and 
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documented the broken-in door.  Moreover, shortly after the incident, Colon told police 
and Susan McMullins that Murphy broke down her door and beat her, and the McMullins 
observed Colon and Murphy arguing beforehand.     
In light of this evidence, the “relaxed burden of proof[,] and our deferential scope 
of review,” United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1991), we cannot say 
that the District Court erred in finding that Murphy violated a condition of his supervised 
release.   
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
